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AN  ARGUMENT  AGAINST  OPEN-FILE  DISCOVERY
IN  CRIMINAL  CASES
Brian P. Fox*
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage.  While the prosecution is
held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his defense.  He is immune
from question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the least fair doubt
in the minds of any one of the twelve [jurors].  Why in addition he should in advance have the
whole evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, I
have never been able to see. . . .  Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused.
Our procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted.  It is an
unreal dream.  What we need to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that
obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime.
— Judge Learned Hand, United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y.
1923).
INTRODUCTION
After more than a year of media hype surrounding accusations of rape
against three college athletes at Duke University (dubbed the “Duke Lacrosse
Case”1), North Carolina Attorney General Roy A. Cooper publicly
announced the students’ innocence and decried the prosecutor assigned to
the case for his “tragic rush to accuse [the students] and a failure to verify
serious allegations.”2  The fallout from this unethical prosecution included
* J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2014; B.S.B.A. in
Accounting, Bucknell University, 2009.  An earlier version of this Note was the Notre Dame
Law School recipient of the Smith-Doheny Legal Ethics Award.  I thank Professors Gerard
V. Bradley, Stephen F. Smith, and Jay Tidmarsh for their masterful teaching of the subjects
discussed in this Note.  Their instruction grew my interest in the legal topics this Note
discusses.  I especially thank Professor Smith for serving as my advisor in this process, and
Sara Bohan, Lauren Riley, and Justin Molitoris for their detailed feedback on early drafts
of this Note.  Thank you to Volume 89 of the Notre Dame Law Review.  All errors are my
own.
1 Looking Back at the Duke Lacrosse Case, DUKE OFFICE OF NEWS & COMMC’NS, http://
today.duke.edu/showcase/lacrosseincident (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
2 Roy Cooper, N.C. Att’y Gen., Press Conference Concluding the Duke Lacrosse Case
Investigation (Apr. 11, 2007) (transcript available at http://edition.cnn.com/2007/LAW/
04/11/cooper.transcript).  Cooper went on to say:
[I]n this case, with the weight of the state behind him, the Durham district attor-
ney pushed forward unchecked.  There were many points in this case where cau-
tion would have served justice better than bravado, and in the rush to
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the disbarment of “ ‘rogue’ prosecutor” Mike Nifong3 and an onslaught of
calls for reform and more oversight in criminal prosecutions.4  More specifi-
cally, many commentators saw this attempted miscarriage of justice as the
perfect resurgence for an argument in favor of “open-file discovery.”5
Open-file discovery is the idea that the prosecution should provide the
defense with everything in the prosecution’s file—including witness state-
ments and the names of witnesses, forensic evidence, and police reports.
The defense would have access to this information without regard to the
materiality of the evidence or the likelihood that the prosecution would
introduce that evidence at trial.6  The argument for open-file discovery, as
reinvigorated by the Duke Lacrosse Case, is, “Had Mr. Nifong been operating
under an open-file policy, the Duke Lacrosse Case never would have devel-
oped as far as it did.”  Mr. Nifong had DNA evidence in his possession that
conclusively exonerated the accused Duke students.7  If the defense had
complete access to Mr. Nifong’s files, the argument goes, they would have
discovered the DNA evidence and the case would have ended.  Unfortu-
nately, the commentators in favor of open-file discovery failed to focus on the
condemn[,] a community and a state . . . lost the ability to see clearly.  Regardless
of the reasons that this case was pushed forward, the result was wrong.  Today[,]
we need to learn from this and keep it from happening again to anybody.
Id.
3 Duff Wilson, Prosecutor Apologizes to Ex-Players, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2007, at A14,
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0DE0DC133FF930A25757
C0A9619C8B63 (quoting N.C. Att’y Gen. Roy Cooper); see also Lara Setrakian & Chris
Francescani, Former Duke Prosecutor Nifong Disbarred, ABC NEWS, June 16, 2007, http://abc
news.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=3285862&page=1 (“‘We are in unanimous agreement that
there is no discipline short of disbarment that would be appropiate [sic] in this case,’ said
F. Lane Williamson, the [North Carolina Bar disciplinary] committee’s chairman. . . .  The
bar’s three-member disciplinary panel . . . found Nifong guilty of fraud, dishonesty,
deceit[,] or misrepresentation; of making false statements of material fact before a
judge . . . [and] bar investigators, and of lying about withholding exculpatory DNA evi-
dence, among other violations.”).
4 See R. Michael Cassidy, The Prosecutor and the Press: Lessons (Not) Learned from the Mike
Nifong Debacle, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 68 (2008); Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory
Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full
Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 257 (2008); Abby L. Dennis, Note, Reining
in the Minister of Justice: Prosecutorial Oversight and the Superseder Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 131,
132–34 (2007).
5 A LexisNexis terms and connectors search for “‘open-file discovery’ or ‘open-file
policy’” revealed that roughly half of all law review articles mentioning open-file discovery
were published after the Duke Lacrosse Case came to an end.  (Search performed Jan. 28,
2013.) See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2126
(2010); Mosteller, supra note 4, at 272; The Phases and Faces of the Duke Lacrosse Controversy: A
Conversation, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 181, 206–07 (2009) (statements of K.C.
Johnson & Angela Davis); Andrew Smith, Note, Brady Obligations, Criminal Sanctions, and
Solutions in a New Era of Scrutiny, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1935, 1960–64 (2008).
6 See infra Section I.A.1.
7 See Mosteller, supra note 4, at 293–94 (recounting the defense attorneys’ procedural
steps to enforce discovery requirements upon Mr. Nifong).
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genesis of this foiled witch-hunt.  The problem in the Duke Lacrosse Case
was not the “closedness” of the prosecution’s discovery files, but rather a
“malicious[ ] conspir[acy] to bring charges . . . against . . . three innocent
students.”8  Luckily for these students, Mr. Nifong bit off a little bit more
than he could chew, and the defense counsel was able to expose the poorly
orchestrated prosecutorial grandstanding and clear the students’ names.9
The case drew a national spotlight, and the defendants could afford private
counsel to investigate the prosecutor’s claims—not the best situation for a
prosecutor attempting to hide evidence.10
This Note argues that, for the most part, open-file discovery proponents
fail to recognize the added burden that defense counsel would face under a
regime in which all items of the prosecution’s evidence are available for
investigation by the defense.11  This is particularly true in the eighty to ninety
percent of criminal cases where the defendant is indigent, and the court-
appointed defense counsel is operating under strict resource constraints.12
8 Second Amended Complaint at 1, Evans v. City of Durham, No. 1:07CV739
(M.D.N.C. Feb. 18, 2010).
9 Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A Fun-
damental Failure to “Do Justice,” 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1361 (2007).
10 See Cooper, supra note 2 (“The[ ] defendants were able to retain counsel[,] . . . no
doubt at a high cost.”).
11 See, e.g., THE JUSTICE PROJECT, EXPANDED DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES: A POLICY
REVIEW 4 (2007), available at http://pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Re
ports/Death_penalty_reform/Expanded%20Discovery%20Policy%20Brief.pdf (“The bur-
den of implementing an open-file system should be minimal . . . .”).
12 Representation of Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases: A Constitutional Crisis in Michi-
gan and Other States?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 84 (2009) [hereinafter Judiciary Committee Hearing]
(statement of Robin L. Dahlberg, Senior Staff Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union,
New York, N.Y.) (“Researchers estimate that between 80 and 90 percent of all of those
accused of criminal wrongdoing by state prosecutors must rely upon state indigent defense
programs . . . .”).
This is in no way meant to be a swipe at the quality of work performed by public
defenders, but rather a comment on the amount of work public defenders are tasked with
handling.  In a recent study performed by the RAND Corporation, an analysis of indigent
defense counsel in Philadelphia murder cases during the period of 1994 to 2005 revealed
that public defenders significantly outperformed their private appointed counsel counter-
parts.  State public defenders reduced their indigent defendants’ conviction rate by
nineteen percent, reduced the likelihood of a life sentence by sixty-two percent, and their
defendants received prison sentences that were an average of twenty-four percent shorter.
James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect of
Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes 15–21 (RAND Corp., Working Paper No. WR-870-
NIJ, 2011); see also LYNN LANGTON & DONALD FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 228229,
STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER PROGRAMS, 2007, at 3 (2010) (“[State and county p]ublic defender
offices nationwide employed over 15,000 litigating attorneys . . . [to handle] approximately
5.6 million indigent defense cases . . . .”); OFFICE OF JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE 2000: REDEFINING LEADERSHIP FOR EQUAL JUS-
TICE vii (2000) (remarks of Janet Reno, Att’y Gen. of the United States) (“[T]he competent
lawyer needs . . . the investigat[ive] tools to go with [his competence], because the search
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This Note also argues that advocates of open-file discovery fail to recognize
that in the majority of cases involving prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecu-
tor’s intentional wrongdoing will be sufficient to overshadow any reasonable
amount of diligence performed by defense counsel.13
This Note will contend that instituting an open-file discovery policy
would only compound the problem of providing adequate representation to
defendants.  In light of the fact that the overwhelming majority of defendants
are represented by publicly funded counsel, this Note will focus on the
effects of open-file discovery to indigent defendants.  Specifically, it will argue
that any attendant benefits received by a single defendant under an open-file
discovery regime would be largely outweighed by the costs to defendants as a
whole and to the judicial system.  This Note will demonstrate that the eco-
nomic consequences of open-file discovery would be disastrous in the current
judicial environment and would serve as nothing more than a shifting of bur-
dens from the prosecution to the defense.  The effect of this burden shifting
would lead to more overworked public defenders and lower quality represen-
tation for indigent defendants.  This Note will also demonstrate that in the
cases often cited as the hallmark evidence showing a need for open-file dis-
covery—those in which innocent defendants are convicted because the pros-
ecution affirmatively fails to disclose exculpatory evidence—open-file
discovery would serve no actual purpose in eliminating the prosecutorial mis-
conduct.  This Note will show that open-file discovery would cause more
harm than good by creating a situation in which prosecutors could over-
whelm defense counsel with evidence, either intentionally or unintentionally,
and frustrate defense counsel’s ability to locate and synthesize critical
evidence.
Part I will begin with an overview of what open-file discovery entails,
including some of the key arguments trumpeted by supporters and some of
the counterarguments offered by those opposed to open-file discovery.  It will
also discuss how open-file discovery relates to constitutional disclosure
requirements and the timing issues related to plea bargaining and trial.  Part
II will analyze the first major hurdle to the implementation of open-file dis-
covery: economic constraints of the criminal justice system, with a particular
focus on the prosecution and defense of indigents.  The analysis will consider
the current economic climate of indigent defense and also the economic
feasibility of open-file discovery.  Part III will discuss the second major obsta-
cle that an open-file discovery regime would face: the practical consequences
of open-file discovery and the actual coincident benefits to defendants.  Par-
ticular focus will be paid to the inability of open-file discovery to combat
prosecutorial malfeasance and the unethical advantages prosecutors can gain
by giving defendants open access to the evidence.  Finally, the Conclusion
for the truth is often illusory if you have neither the time nor the tools to supplement your
competence.”).
13 The exceptions being scenarios similar to the Duke Lacrosse Case, where the prose-
cution attempts malfeasance while standing in a national spotlight.
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will summarize the arguments against open-file discovery and advocate main-
taining the current system of limited discovery for criminal defendants.
I. OVERVIEW OF OPEN-FILE DISCOVERY
A. Breadth of Allowable Discovery
Unlike modern discovery in civil trials, criminal discovery is very
restricted.14  There are many reasons to be critical of this dichotomy, the
most prevalent of which is the injustice of placing a greater importance on
cases involving money than on cases “where the freedom and, sometimes, the
life of the defendant are at stake.”15  However, while the prosecution is not
required to provide open access to all of its investigative findings, it is
required to turn over “material” evidence to the defense—that evidence
which is exculpatory in nature (dubbed “Brady evidence”).16  The most often
cited reasons in support of this restrictive discovery regime in criminal cases
are the protection of witnesses and the fact that defendants already have a
heavy enough thumb on their side of the scales of justice.17
1. Open-File Discovery
The central premise of open-file discovery is that everything the prosecu-
tion knows should be revealed to the defendant.  Nothing is held back—if
the prosecution has a piece of evidence, the defense has access to that same
piece.18  The leading argument for open-file discovery is that the “quest for
14 Cf. Ellen Yaroshefsky, New Orleans Prosecutorial Disclosure in Practice After Connick v.
Thompson, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 913, 939 (2012) (noting the two states that have
adopted laws requiring near-open-file discovery: North Carolina and Ohio).
15 THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 11, at 1.
16 So named for the landmark case of Brady v. Maryland, in which the Supreme Court
concluded that “the suppression . . . of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.”  373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963).  Evidence in the hands of the government, even if unknown by the prosecution,
must be turned over to the defendant if, and “only if[,] there is a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.”  United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (Justice Blackmun writ-
ing for himself and Justice O’Connor) (emphasis added).
17 See RICHARD G. SINGER, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE II: FROM BAIL TO JAIL 84 (3d ed. 2012).
Defendants are given many constitutional protections and the standards of proof required
to find guilt are heavily in the defendants’ favor. See infra notes 32–36 and accompanying
text.
18 The defense is provided with everything that the prosecution has found by way of its
investigation—police reports, witness statements, witnesses’ identities, scientific test
results—rather than just a more specific and limited file of constitutionally material infor-
mation. See Avis E. Buchanan, Op-Ed., Fairer Trials, and Better Justice, for D.C., WASH. POST,
Oct. 30, 2011, at C7; Joel Cohen & Danielle Alfonzo Walsman, The ‘Brady Dump’: Problems
with ‘Open File’ Discovery, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 4, 2009, available at http://www.stroock.com/site
content.cfm?contentID=58&itemID=829.
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truth” outweighs any possible arguments against broader discovery.19  The
legal system is designed to seek out the truth, and “[t]he truth is most likely
to emerge when each side seeks to take the other by reason rather than by
surprise.”20  Defendants are almost always operating with a significantly
smaller budget.21  Thus, it is unjust to allow the side with more resources to
control the disposition of a criminal case merely because a defendant cannot
afford to perform independent investigation.22
Supporters of open-file discovery also maintain that better-informed
defendants will lead to more efficient dispositions of criminal cases.23
Defendants can make informed decisions about whether to proceed to trial
or plead guilty when they know the full weight of the evidence against
them.24  When faced with all of the evidence, more defendants are likely to
plead guilty, thus the prosecutor can avoid the time and expense of a trial.25
The belief is that the moral justifications for permitting defendants access to
prosecutors’ files, combined with the cost savings for prosecutors, make
open-file discovery a “win-win.”
2. Limited Discovery
In spite of the compelling justice-based arguments in favor of open-file
discovery, opponents offer two main reasons why open-file discovery should
not be the law of the land: witness intimidation and fairness.  The words “wit-
ness intimidation” evoke images of mobsters knocking on the doors of inno-
cent bystanders who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.
Many commentators dismiss the risk of witness intimidation by proposing
that the prosecution should bear the burden of showing witness safety is an
issue, on a case-by-case basis.26  However, witness intimidation is a very real
This information is turned over to the defense well in advance of trial so that the
defense has time to scrutinize and independently verify the prosecution’s evidence.  See
Buchanan, supra.
19 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?,
1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 279, 287.
20 Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 228,
249 (1964).
21 Id.
22 See infra Section II.A; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 5 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 20.1(b) (3d ed. 2007) (noting several arguments and counter-arguments regarding the
expansion of discovery).
23 See, e.g., Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform After Connick and
Garcetti, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1329, 1372 (2012) (“[Open-file discovery] reduce[s] the signif-
icant costs resulting from alleged and actual error in criminal cases . . . .”).
24 See Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1560
(2010); Smith, supra note 5, at 1963.
25 Medwed, supra note 24, at 1560.
26 See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 516
(2009) (arguing that the prosecution should bear the burden of demonstrating why wit-
nesses’ identities and all other evidence should not be automatically disclosed).
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thing—and not just in cases involving organized crime.27  In a study per-
formed by New York’s Victim Services Agency and the Vera Institute of Jus-
tice, twenty-six percent of the witnesses interviewed had been threatened by
defendants, defendants’ families, or defendants’ friends.28  The threat to wit-
ness safety has not been overlooked by criminal procedure rulemakers.  For
example, under current federal guidelines, witness identification must be
revealed to the defense only after the witness has testified.29  This may do
little to dispel witnesses’ fears of reprisal, but it will at least prevent some
witness tampering prior to testimony.  Witnesses play an important role in
convictions, and currently prosecutors are able to use their best judgment to
decide the appropriate time to reveal witnesses’ identities.30
The second reason most often cited for limitation of defendants’ discov-
ery is that defendants already have enough of an advantage in our adversarial
system.31  Defendants have the Fifth Amendment protection from self-
incrimination, which allows them to refrain from testifying,32 and the Fourth
Amendment protection from illegal searches.33  Defendants are also entitled
to a presumption of innocence that the prosecution must overcome by prov-
27 See David Kocieniewski, Scared Silent: In Witness Killing, Prosecutors Point to a Gang and
a Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2007, at A1 (“Yet another key witness in a major drug case
ha[s] been shot dead before he could testify in court.”).
28 See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, WITNESS INTIMIDATION 4 (1985) (noting also that thirty-
nine percent of witnesses were “very much afraid of revenge by defendants”).  The study
included only witnesses in cases where the crime was reported and an arrest was made—
thus, the proportion of actual witness intimidation may in fact be higher due to instances
in which the witness did not report the crime out of fear of the defendant. Id.
29 See Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (2006); see also United States v. Anderson, 574
F.2d 1347, 1352 (1978) (“[W]hen alleged Brady [evidence] is contained in Jencks Act
material, disclosure is generally timely if the government complies with the Jencks Act.”);
cf. Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudi-
cation in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 275 (2005) (noting that many
states have much more lax policies regarding the availability of discovery in general,
including witnesses’ identities).
30 For a discussion of the importance of prosecutors having discretion as to when wit-
nesses’ identities should be revealed, see Panel Discussion: Criminal Discovery in Practice, 15
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 804 (1999) (“[P]rosecutors . . . have many interests that must be
balanced; one of which clearly is the constitutional rights of the accused.  That is acknowl-
edged.  But protection of witnesses and protection of the community are also important.”
(statement of Art Leach, Assistant U.S. Attorney)).
31 See Martin Marcus, Above the Fray or into the Breach: The Judge’s Role in New York’s
Adversarial System of Criminal Justice, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1193, 1193 (1992) (“The adversarial
model . . . assumes that justice is best served by giving the prosecutor and defense counsel
primary responsibility for the development and presentation of their own cases.”).
32 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding
that a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights are violated when a prosecutor or judge makes
comments to the jury suggesting that a defendant’s refusal to testify is indicative of guilt).
33 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)
(explaining that any “fruit” (evidence) obtained by way of a “poisonous tree” (illegal
search) is also excludable); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that
evidence obtained during an illegal search was excludable).
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ing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.34  Further, if a defendant were entitled
to a copy of the prosecution’s playbook, the defendant could more readily
tailor his defense to combat the prosecution (e.g., defendant perjury35).
With broader, more detailed discovery, defendants could more easily concoct
detailed alibis to effectively manufacture reasonable doubt.36  All in all,
“[B]roader discovery tilts the balance of advantage, which already favors the
defendant . . . , too far . . . to the benefit of the defendant.”37
34 See, e.g., Potter v. United States, 155 U.S. 438, 448 (1894) (“[T]he burden of proof is
on the government, and the defendant is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt.”).
35 See Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal
Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1622 (2005).  Defendants need only create a reasonable
doubt of their guilt.  Having full access to the prosecution’s evidence and witnesses
expands a defendant’s opportunity to prepare testimony that raises such reasonable doubt.
This is especially true in trials lasting only one day, where defense counsel does not have an
overnight recess to prepare the defendant in accordance with what the prosecutor has
already revealed during trial. See Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1097, 1151 (2004).  Professor Brown also notes that, “A fairness argument . . . justifies
limits: expansive discovery cannot be fully reciprocal because defendants cannot be com-
pelled to reveal self-incriminating evidence.”  Brown, supra, at 1622 n.133.
36 See Mosteller, supra note 4, at 272–73.
37 Id. at 273.  There is another balance-tilting consideration worth noting: the stigma
of being a victim.  Consider the situation of a prosecution for rape.  According to the
Department of Justice, only forty-nine percent of all rapes are reported to the police. JEN-
NIFER L. TRUMAN & MICHAEL PLANTY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 239437, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZA-
TION, 2011, at 8 (2012) (analyzing crimes that took place in 2010).  Of the reasons for not
reporting rape, some of the most common answers include “[s]hame, embarrass-
ment, . . . desire to keep the assault a private matter[, and h]umiliation.” NAT’L INST. OF JUST.,
Reporting of Sexual Violence Incidents, http://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/rape-sexual-vio
lence/rape-notification.htm#note4 (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) (emphasis added).  If rape
victims are unwilling to report their assaults under conditions in which the police report
and medical examination are available only to the parties fighting for the victims’ vindica-
tion (e.g., the prosecution and police), it is only intuitive that they will be less likely to
report the crimes when the details of these files are openly available to the defendant, his
counsel, and any other parties the defendant wishes to consult.
Also consider victims’ reluctance to report their assaults in situations where the prose-
cutor is not the party determining materiality of impeaching evidence from a victim’s past.
For example, under an open-file policy, the prosecution has no discretion in deciding
whether to disclose that a victim was sexually assaulted by a relative thirty years before the
rape occurred. See R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem
of Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1474 (2011); see also MCCORMICK ON EVI-
DENCE § 193 (Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 6th ed. 2006) (“The statutes and cases are
divided . . . [as to the admissibility of] prior accusations of rape . . . .”).  This evidence may
be material to the credibility of the witness’s testimony, but it may just be used as defen-
dant’s muckraking to forestall a victim’s willingness to testify.  Outside of an open-file
regime, this impeaching evidence would only have to be disclosed as Brady evidence if it
were material to the outcome of the proceeding.
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B. The Spirit of Brady
A central theme underlying arguments in favor of open-file discovery is
that it comports with the ethos of Brady rather than just the black letter law.
Brady’s aim was to protect defendants from government actors38 seeking to
conceal evidence that either exculpates the defendant or casts doubt on the
honesty and accuracy of a witness’s testimony.39  Unfortunately for the cham-
pions of open-file discovery, Brady and its legacy have led not to a world of
expanded discovery rights, but to a world that continues to rely on the prose-
cution’s judgment in determining what evidence is “material” and therefore
constitutionally required to be shared with the defense.  As advocates of
open-file discovery are quick to point out, there are inherent problems with
this model.
A key difficulty with this framework is that the prosecution must deter-
mine if evidence is going to be material prospectively, but after-the-fact evalua-
tions for possible Brady violations are performed retrospectively.40  A Brady
violation does not occur merely because the prosecutor did not disclose some
piece of evidence favorable to the defendant’s case.  Withheld evidence is
material only if it renders the outcome of the trial unreliable.41  The Brady
inquiry also requires “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
ent.”42  This outcome-determinative test is far easier to apply retrospectively
by courts than it is for prosecutors to apply before knowing how a trial will
unfold—though many courts’ reluctance to find Brady violations suggests
that courts are sympathetic to the difficulties a prosecutor faces in deciding
materiality ex ante.43  The inherent flaws in allowing the prosecutor to deter-
38 This includes not just the prosecutor, but also the police.
39 See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that due process is
violated when the prosecution withholds evidence favorable to the accused and that evi-
dence is material to either guilt or punishment); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
(1972) (holding that the prosecution’s failure to inform the defense about a deal made
with a witness was a violation of due process).
40 Cassidy, supra note 37, at 1436.
41 See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995) (stating that undisclosed evidence is
material if it “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict”).
42 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (Justice Blackmun writing for him-
self and Justice O’Connor). But see News Release: Prosecutors’ Ethical Duty to Reveal Information
Favorable to Defense is Broader than Constitution Demands, AM. BAR ASS’N, (Aug. 20, 2009),
available at http://apps.americanbar.org/abanet/media/release/news_release.cfm?re
leaseid=752 (noting that “while the Constitution only requires [prosecutors] to reveal
‘material’ information, or evidence . . . they view as likely to lead to acquittal[,] Rule 3.8(d)
[of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct] requires prosecu-
tors to share [a much broader array of] information”).
43 Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the Search
for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES, 129, 143–44 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006).
This difficulty for prosecutors is compounded even more by the cognitive biases inher-
ent in human beings.  Prosecutors’ decisions may be skewed by an overconfidence bias—
the tendency for people to believe they will fare better than others in particular situations
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mine materiality lead many commentators to believe the “spirit” of Brady is
better served by giving defendants unfettered access to the prosecution’s
files.
However, as obvious as the flaws of Brady are, they do not exist in a
bubble.  That is, the problems inherent in the Brady model’s disclosure of
only material exculpatory information are not discrete from the rest of the
criminal justice system.  The alternative—for purposes of this Note, open-file
discovery—would cure some of the defects of the Brady model.  Nevertheless,
open-file discovery would also result in an untenable model that would actu-
ally work to harm those defendants most in need of protection from the judi-
cial system—indigents.
II. THE FIRST HURDLE: ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS
OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
A. Current Economic Costs of Criminal Cases
1. Criminal Defense
The current state of indigent defense in America is bleak.  As Represen-
tative Bobby Scott, then Chairman of the House of Representatives Subcom-
mittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, put it: “[I]ndigent
defense [is] . . . in a chronic state of crisis.”44  It is no secret that representing
indigent defendants is hard work with low pay.  The median starting salary
for public defenders was $45,700 in 2010.45  The reward for this modest sal-
ary46 is a workload of approximately 154% of the maximum public defender
workload recommended by the Department of Justice.47
(e.g., car accidents happen to other people)—or self-serving bias—the tendency for peo-
ple to see information as supportive of their viewpoints. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas
S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Econom-
ics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1091–95 (2000).  Additionally, outsiders, like judges making a
retrospective analysis, may be affected by hindsight bias—the tendency of people to overes-
timate the likelihood that they would have correctly predicted an outcome, because they
are already aware of the actual outcome that occurred. Id. at 1095–96.
44 Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 12, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Representative Scott went on to say that “indigent defense . . . needs more funding . . .  [to
offset] excessive and questioned caseloads[,] . . . lack of proper training[,] . . . lack of
independence by defense [counsel,] and ultimately . . . wrongful conviction[s].” Id. at 2.
45 Some Associate Salaries Retreat from Their High but Remain Far Ahead of Salaries for Public
Service Attorneys, NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, INC. (Sept. 9, 2010) [hereinafter NALP
PRESS RELEASE], available at http://www.nalp.org/assoc_pi_sal2010; see Tucker Carrington,
Counseling Conscience, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 191, 195 (2012) (discussing the “laughably
low figure” indigent defenders are paid for their services).
46 Modest as compared to both their prosecutorial counterparts (median starting sal-
ary of $50,000) and private-sector attorneys (median starting salary of $115,000). NALP
PRESS RELEASE, supra note 45, at 1.
47 Of the twenty-two states employing statewide public defender systems (4,321 total
public defenders), public defender offices had a median rate of sixty-seven percent of the
recommended minimum number of public defenders for their associated caseloads.
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One of the largest contributing factors to the overworked, stressful envi-
ronment of public defenders’ offices is the amount of funding allocated to
indigent defense.  Compared to the $5.8 billion48 operating budget of their
prosecutorial adversaries, state indigent defense offices received only $2.33
billion49 in funding for the year 2007.50  Adjusting the prosecutors’ budget
for the time spent on non-indigent defendants, the math still paints a picture
in which the prosecution has an overwhelming monetary advantage—$4.64
billion,51 or roughly twice the public defenders’ budget.
2. Criminal Prosecution
The aspect of criminal prosecution most relevant to this discussion is the
time constraints prosecutors face, which ultimately lead to more bargained-
for guilty pleas.  Much of the budgetary strain on the criminal justice system
is due to the “societal pressure to be tough on crime without a commitment
to provid[ing] the required resources to do so consistent with justice.”52  It is
no surprise that prosecutors facing this “societal pressure” obtain roughly
ninety-five percent of all convictions by way of guilty pleas.53  Through guilty
pleas, prosecutors are able to procure just results—convictions—without hav-
ing to expend the time and money resources required by a trial.54  Guilty
pleas are such a pervasive and necessary part of the American criminal justice
system that a thirty-three percent decrease in the number of defendants con-
victed by way of guilty pleas would cause a 300% increase in the number of
LANGTON & FAROLE, supra note 12, at 12–13.  Of the twenty-eight states employing locality-
funded public defender systems (10,705 total public defenders), public defender offices
had a median rate of sixty-four percent of the recommended minimum number of public
defenders for their associated caseloads. DONALD J. FAROLE, JR. & LYNN LANGTON, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 231175, COUNTY-BASED AND LOCAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007, at
3, 10 (2010).
48 STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN BANKS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 234211, PROSECUTORS IN
STATE COURTS, 2007 – STATISTICAL TABLES, at 1 (2011).
49 LANGTON & FAROLE, supra note 12, at 1 ($830 million for state public defender
systems); FAROLE & LANGTON, supra note 47, at 1 ($1.5 billion for county-based and local
public defender systems).
50 Most recent data available as of the writing of this Note.  The amounts comprise the
total budgets available to the respective offices—including support staff, investigators, and
attorneys.
51 This figure was computed assuming prosecutors’ offices spend the same portion of
resources on a case, irrespective of the type of counsel representing the defendant (e.g.,
public defender, as compared to private counsel).  This figure is also computed under the
conservative assumption that eighty percent of defendants are indigent. See supra note 12
and accompanying text.
52 Jonathan A. Rapping, Who’s Guarding the Henhouse? How the American Prosecutor Came
to Devour Those He Is Sworn to Protect, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 513, 518 (2012).
53 See 2 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
ADJUDICATION 176 (4th ed. 2006).
54 Id.
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criminal trials.55  Since criminal trials consume far more prosecutorial
resources than do guilty pleas,56 replacing guilty pleas with criminal trials
would require either a decrease in the number of (presumably)57 guilty
defendants brought to answer for their crimes or an enormous increase in
55 See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J.
1909, 1932 (1992) (“[O]ne can safely make . . . basic assumptions about the effects of
abolishing plea bargaining[, including that] the number of trials would increase sharply.
[About] ninety percent of cases now lead to [guilty] pleas; if even one-third of those . . .
[went to trial it would] quadruple the number of criminal trials.”).  Note that the percent-
age of criminal cases ending in guilty pleas has increased from ninety percent to ninety-five
percent since 1992, so the quadrupling factor would be even higher using today’s guilty
plea rates, assuming a constant number of criminal cases. See also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.
Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012)  (“[Plea bargaining] is the criminal justice system.” (quoting Scott &
Stuntz, supra, at 1912)).
56 This does not even consider the heightened resource constraints caused by the
more in-depth police investigations necessary to solidify a conviction as opposed to a bar-
gained-for punishment where prosecutors do not need beyond-a-reasonable-doubt-level
evidence.  Nor does it consider the judicial resources required to conduct four times the
number of trials—quadruply the jury costs, the time devoted to the actual trial, the time
needed to dispose of additional motions, etc. But see Medwed, supra note 24, at 1560
(“Defendants who are fully aware of the strength of the case against them might express
greater willingness to accept plea bargains than those who lack such insight.”).
57 See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE, at xxi–xxii (1982) (proposing that
there are thirteen rules of the “justice game,” the first of which is “[a]lmost all criminal
defendants are, in fact, guilty”).
A recent analysis of both empirical data and case law has poked holes in the popular
fear that many innocent defendants plead guilty to avoid the risk of the enormous punish-
ments that are often handed down after convictions at trial. See Avishalom Tor et al., Fair-
ness and the Willingness to Accept Plea Bargain Offers, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 97, 97 (2010).
The study supports the claim that innocent defendants are significantly less likely to plead
guilty than are factually guilty defendants. Id.  Due to perceptions of unfairness in
accepting a punishment that does not fit the crime (e.g., where no crime was actually
committed), innocents (and even defendants who are unsure of their guilt or innocence)
are systematically less likely to accept plea bargains even though the risk of conviction is
statistically great and the anticipated punishment if convicted at trial is significantly greater
than the bargained-for punishment.  Consider the infamous Tulia drug scandal in which
the first six defendants implicated all pled not guilty despite having seen the defendants
before them receive sentences of 12 to 434 years in prison from convictions at trial based
on almost identical evidence.  All six defendants were offered heavily discounted sentences
in exchange for a guilty plea.  The sixth defendant “who received a 20-year sentence
[despite seeing] five previous defendants convicted based on the same testimony . . . still
refused a five-year plea offer because of his innocence.” Id. at 97, 99 n.4, 100.
There are obvious limitations to the conclusions reached by this article due to the fact
that it is virtually impossible to truly establish any defendant’s guilt or innocence with com-
plete certainty, and it is equally as impossible to determine the “acquittal probabilities” of
real trials. Id. at 114.  However, the arguments made, based in behavioral economics ideas,
are well-supported by the data presented and the examples discussed. Id. at 99–100 (not-
ing that of the “hundreds of exonerations from the last two decades . . . merely 6 percent
of the exonerates . . . [were] defendants who pled guilty,” compared to the “more than 90
percent [rate of] guilty pleas of felony convictions generally”); see also Oren Gazal-Ayal &
Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE L.J. 339, 347–48 (2012) (“[The] guilty [are]
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the prosecution’s budget.58  Much like the unanswered call for increased
indigent defense funding, it is unlikely the prosecution’s budget would
increase sufficiently.59  If something were to cause prosecutors to be less
dependent on guilty pleas, the likely result would be a decrease in the num-
ber of guilty defendants who are punished for their wrongdoings—prosecu-
tors and the police would have to concentrate their limited resources on
thoroughly investigating and trying a fewer number of criminals.
B. Economic Costs Under Open-File Discovery
The pillar argument by proponents of open-file discovery is, unlike in
criminal cases where the stakes of litigation are infinitely higher, the Ameri-
can discovery rules for civil cases allow for near complete revelation of the
opponent’s evidence.60  A defendant in a civil case can discover every card
his opponent holds, drastically dwarfing what the defendant has access to in a
criminal case.61  The schism in discovery rules between the civil and criminal
courts seems wrong given the comparative importance of the subject matter
of litigation.
However, this argument-in-chief ignores one of the key differences
between civil and criminal defendants—all civil defendants are represented
by retained counsel, whereas eighty to ninety percent of criminal defendants
are represented by public defenders with highly limited resources.62  Comb-
ing through all of the information included in the prosecution’s file can be a
very time consuming process, even absent gamesmanship on the part of the
the main beneficiaries of large plea discounts . . . [because] innocents . . . disproportion-
ately go to trial.”).
58 See, e.g., Scott & Stuntz, supra note 55, at 1932 (“The total number of convictions
would fall [if plea bargaining rates were diminished], probably substantially . . . [and it]
would raise the average cost of prosecution . . . .”).
59 See Greg Bluestein, State Budget Cuts Clog Criminal Justice System, MSNBC (Oct. 26,
2011, 2:12 PM) http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45049812/ns/us_news-crime_and_
courts/t/state-budget-cuts-clog-criminal-justice-system/ (“Deep budget cuts to courts, pub-
lic defenders, district attorney’s [sic] and attorney general offices are testing the criminal
justice system across the country.”); RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ADJU-
DICATION AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL 1165 (2011) (“In jurisdictions with both high crime rates
and strapped budgets—two characteristics shared by most American cities—plea rates are
higher still.”); see also infra note 69.
60 See, e.g., Brian Gregory, Comment, Brady Is the Problem: Wrongful Convictions and the
Case for “Open File” Criminal Discovery, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 819, 846 (2012) (“Given the respec-
tive liberty interests at stake for civil and criminal defendants . . . it makes sense that crimi-
nal defendants be afforded discovery rights that meet or exceed those afforded civil
defendants . . . .”); see also Mosteller, supra note 4, at 272 (“Criminal discovery has lagged
behind civil discovery . . . [despite the fact that] the stakes are often higher than in civil
cases . . . .”).
61 See Buchanan, supra note 18; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (outlining the federal
court rules related to discovery in civil cases).
62 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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prosecution.63  Assuming no prosecutorial malice, in many cases, full open-
file discovery gives defense counsel access to mountains of evidence.64
Rather than simply allowing the prosecutor to act as the gatekeeper who
determines what information is Brady evidence, material to the defendant’s
guilt, open-file discovery places an even greater workload on the public defend-
ers presently operating at a 154% utilization rate.65  In a world where an
ethical prosecutor is not actively attempting to hide exculpatory evidence,66
it may be in the defendant’s best interest to allow the prosecutor’s office—
with double the resources67 and the discretion to drop criminal charges68—
to make the assessment of what evidence materially undermines the likeli-
hood of the defendant’s guilt.  The only scenario where this increased wor-
kload would not disfavor defendants is one in which there is a dramatic
increase in the funding of indigent defense—a highly unlikely event.69  But
even increased funding might not be truly effective.  As one scholar noted,
“Even with improved funding, serious failings by counsel would continue, as
occurs today . . . with retained counsel and in jurisdictions where adequate
funding is provided.”70
The argument for open-file discovery also ignores the necessary increase
in the prosecution’s resources.  Under current constitutional law, due pro-
cess requires that Brady evidence be disclosed for trial.  Pretrial guilty pleas do
not implicate this constitutional right—materially favorable evidence does
63 See infra Section III.B; Cohen & Walsman, supra note 18, at 1 (“These days, where
document productions . . . consist of hundreds of thousands—sometimes millions—of
pages, a lawyer’s needle-in-a-haystack gamesmanship may succeed.”).
64 See infra notes 118–23.
65 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
66 Indeed, one would like to believe an ethical prosecutor would not even pursue a
case in which exculpatory evidence is so material as to undermine the confidence in a
potential guilty verdict. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2003) (“A
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.
This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded
procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that
special precautions are taken to prevent . . . the conviction of innocent persons.”). But see
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2003) (requiring only a low threshold of
evidence for prosecution by stating “[t]he prosecutor . . . shall . . . refrain from prosecuting
a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause”); infra Part III.
67 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
68 See Tor et al., supra note 57, at 100 (“[P]rosecutors can alter the charges and facts of
the indictment with virtually no judicial review . . . .”).
69 See Nathan Koppel, Public Defenders Stretched Thin by State Cuts, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704530204576232812464584064
.html (“Many states are seeking spending cuts on public defenders, including some by as
much as 10% to 15% [while public defenders are still taking more clients.]”); see also Blues-
tein, supra note 59 (“[H]undreds of millions of dollars in criminal justice funding . . . have
been cut amid the economic downturn, hampering the ability of authorities to investigate
and prosecute cases.”).
70 Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent: Part of the Solution for Inadequate Funding
for Defenders, Not a Panacea for Targeting Justice, 75 MO. L. REV. 931, 977 (2010).
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not have to be revealed to defendants during plea negotiations.71  The Con-
stitution guarantees a fair trial, but it “does not require the prosecutor to
share all useful information with the defendant.”72  While most defendants
would find it highly useful to see all of the prosecution’s evidence at the plea
bargaining stage, “[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a
criminal case,” only in a criminal trial.73  If however, prosecutors were to
adopt an open-file discovery policy that comports with the oft-mentioned
desire that the prosecution’s files be accessible by the defense prior to enter-
ing a guilty plea,74 “it could lead the [prosecution] . . . to abandon its heavy
reliance upon plea bargaining in a vast number . . . of . . . criminal cases.”75
Prosecutors use incentives—like lowering the severity of charges or recom-
mending shorter sentences to the judge—to buy guilty pleas from defendants
so the limited prosecutorial resources can be focused on cases where trials
are necessary.  In refusing to extend the right to obtain Brady evidence in
pretrial proceedings, the Supreme Court specifically noted that one of the
prosecution’s main motives in seeking guilty pleas is to reduce the resources
used for trial preparation.76  Defendants, the Court reasoned, would be less
likely to waive their constitutional trial right and plead guilty if they could see
a more complete picture of the prosecution’s evidence.77
Prosecutors like guilty pleas for the resource savings—both time and
money.78  If prosecutors lost such savings, the key incentive to bargain for
guilty pleas would be gone, and the number of guilty pleas would naturally
go down.  As noted above, a not-farfetched thirty-three percent decrease in
the number of guilty pleas would cause a 300% increase in the number of
“formal, elaborate, and expensive” trials.79  Four times as many trials means
four times as many hours spent by prosecutors preparing and trying the
71 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002); see also id. at 633 (“[T]he need for
this information is . . . related to the fairness of a trial . . . [not] the voluntariness of the
plea . . . .” (second and fourth emphasis added)).
72 Id. at 629 (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977)).
73 Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 559 (emphasis added).
74 See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 60, at 847; Medwed, supra note 24, at 1560.
75 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 632.
76 Id. (“It could require the Government to devote substantially more resources to trial
preparation prior to plea bargaining, thereby depriving the plea-bargaining process of its
main resource-saving advantages.”); see also Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]e accept plea bargaining because many believe that without it
our long and expensive process of criminal trial could not sustain the burden imposed on
it, and our system of criminal justice would grind to a halt.”).
77 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631–32 (“[A] constitutional obligation to provide impeachment
information during plea bargaining . . . could seriously interfere with the [prosecution’s]
interest in securing those guilty pleas that are . . . desired by defendants . . . and help to
secure the efficient administration of justice.”).
78 See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 865 (1999)
(“[P]rosecutors . . . plea bargain[ ] to ease their crushing workloads . . . .”).
79 See supra note 55 and accompanying text; see also ALLEN ET AL., supra note 59, at
1165.
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cases.80  Prosecutors would likely be forced to “cut corners” in order to offset
the greater time commitments, causing new reasons to question the reliabil-
ity of convictions.81
Some commentators have also argued that, overall, open-file discovery
would lighten the burden on the judicial system because the costs associated
with appeals for Brady violations would be greatly reduced by giving defend-
ants access to all of the prosecutors’ evidence.82  However, while opening all
of the prosecution’s files to the defense might have the effect of minimizing
the number of Brady violations, it would likely result in an increase in the
number of post-conviction appeals for ineffective assistance of counsel—
Strickland claims.83 Strickland claims are the means by which defendants chal-
lenge their attorney’s performance during the criminal investigation and
trial.84  These post-conviction appeals for ineffective assistance of counsel
require the defendant to show both that his counsel’s performance did not
“fall[ ] within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” and that
his “counsel’s performance [was] prejudicial” to the defendant.85  Defense
attorneys would be far more likely to render ineffective assistance by missing
a piece of critical evidence if they had access to all of the prosecution’s files.
Instead of looking at only the evidence received from the prosecution under
Brady obligations, defense counsel would have to look for favorable evidence
in all of the prosecution’s files.  Rather than collaterally attacking convictions
80 It also means four times as many hours spent by police investigating the cases.  And
four times as many hours spent by judges and their staff preparing for and trying cases.
And four times as many juries that must be convened, inconvenienced, and compensated.
And four times as many hours spent preparing and trying cases by an already overworked
defense counsel.
Unless the judiciary’s budget dramatically increases—think more courthouses and
staff, not just more judges—the increase in trials will cause an even greater backlog of
defendants. See Bluestein, supra note 59 (“[S]tate budget cuts . . . have led to layoffs of 40
percent of the [San Francisco] court[s’] work force and the closing of 25 of 63 court-
rooms.”).  The most recent available data show the average time between arrest and convic-
tion for state court felony defendants who entered guilty pleas was 125 days. MATTHEW R.
DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 198822, STATE COURT SENTENCING
OF CONVICTED FELONS, 2000 STATISTICAL TABLES 53 (2003).  The average time increases to
210 days when the defendant opts for trial. Id. at 52.  A serious increase from the current
five percent of criminal convictions obtained by way of trial would no doubt cause that 210
day mark to balloon drastically—possibly to the point of constitutional significance. See
supra text accompanying note 53; see also Bluestein, supra note 59 (“Some of the lapses
[from overworked judicial systems] are testing speedy-trial rules, in some cases resulting in
dismissals that otherwise are hard to win.”).
81 Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464,
2476 (2004) (“[P]rosecutors can still find less visible ways to save time and effort by, for
example, inadequately investigating or preparing witnesses.”).
82 See, e.g., THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 11, at 1 (“[E]xpanded criminal discovery
laws . . . [create] fewer reversals and retrials, and . . . enhance judicial efficiency.”).
83 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (establishing a two-part test for
ineffective assistance of counsel).
84 Id. at 675.
85 Id. at 689–92.
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on a claim that the government concealed material, exculpatory evidence—
in which the convicted defendant must show that the government was in pos-
session of the evidence and that the concealment of the evidence under-
mined confidence in the outcome of the trial86—the collateral attack would
now require a showing that the defense counsel’s assistance was ineffective
because he or she neglected to discover one piece of critical evidence among
the potentially large number of files provided by the prosecution.87  While it
is probably true that the number of Brady violation claims would be reduced
if the prosecution were not concealing any evidence, the decrease in Brady
claims would likely be completely offset by the increase in Strickland claims.88
The defendant would then face the difficult task of establishing that his coun-
sel was ineffective, either because counsel performed insufficient investiga-
tion or because counsel did not utilize the exculpatory evidence in the
prosecutor’s open file.89  The defendant would also have to establish that
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”90  The transi-
tion from Brady claims to Strickland claims has little effect because both
“require[ ] materiality [and] use[ ] much the same legal standard and ha[ve]
the same effect.”91
86 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
87 See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390–93 (2005) (holding that defense counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to fully investigate all resources made available by
the government, including the defendant’s prior-conviction records, prison records, juve-
nile court records, and school records).
88 Both Brady claims and Strickland claims require the defendant to become aware of
material exculpatory evidence after the trial, before they can pursue a post-conviction rem-
edy.  Any decrease in one would create an increase in the other, effectively creating a zero-
sum outcome in the total number of post-conviction appeals.
89 Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 390 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
90 Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
91 Mosteller, supra note 70, at 978–79. Strickland claims have proven to be very diffi-
cult to win.  Many states believe that a trial record is too incomplete to adequately allow
direct appeals for ineffective assistance of counsel, requiring collateral challenges to
defense counsel’s effectiveness. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 135
(13th ed. 2012).  Petitioners collaterally challenging their counsels’ effectiveness through
habeas corpus or coram nobis proceedings have no constitutional right to appointed counsel,
adding to the difficulty of winning a Strickland claim.  Carrington, supra note 45, at 194.
Likely proceeding pro se, the petitioner has to establish both prongs of a Strickland chal-
lenge—deficient performance and prejudice. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
This is no easy feat, with many seemingly “obvious” deficient performances being found
constitutionally adequate. See, e.g., Burnett v. Collins, 982 F.2d 922, 930 (5th Cir. 1993)
(counsel drank alcohol before and during trial); Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 872
(5th Cir. 1989) (counsel presented no mitigating evidence); Berry v. King, 765 F.2d 451,
454–55 (5th Cir. 1985) (counsel’s drug use was not sufficient to establish ineffective assis-
tance); Ortiz v. Artuz, 113 F. Supp. 2d 327, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (counsel slept during
trial); Jackson v. State, 290 S.W.3d 574, 585–87 (Ark. 2009) (counsel slept during voir dire);
Bell v. State, 879 So. 2d 423, 442 (Miss. 2004) (counsel did not make an opening state-
ment); Smith v. State, 765 N.E.2d 578, 585–88 (Ind. 2002) (inexperienced counsel
neglected to object to inadmissible evidence on seven occasions).  Even where defendants
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The increased workload on public defenders under an open-file discov-
ery regime is another factor that would drive up the number of Strickland
claims.92  An increase in the amount of time required to pore over the evi-
dence in a particular case would mean more work for each attorney.  Look-
ing at the effectiveness of defense counsel, from a plain English meaning of
effectiveness as opposed to a constitutional meaning, how effective can
overburdened attorneys be?  In a study of New York City public defenders in
the 1980s, public defenders spoke with witnesses in only twenty-one percent
of homicide cases and four percent of non-homicide felony cases.93  Modern
studies suggest the prevailing practices today are little improved.94  Practi-
may have been prejudiced by counsels’ deficient performance, some defense attorneys
would rather avoid the stigma of a Strickland claim than see their clients’ constitutional
rights protected. See Carrington, supra note 45, at 195–96 (“In several instances I have
observed the client, after his complaints are dismissed [by the trial court], placed under
oath at his lawyer’s request and asked to affirm the court’s finding of his lawyer’s compe-
tence in order to preclude a later claim of ineffectiveness of counsel.”).
The one bright spot for criminal defendants is that unlike Brady rights, which pertain
only to trials, the Supreme Court recently held that there is a constitutional right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining stage. See supra notes 71–73 and accompany-
ing text; Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (holding that counsel’s assistance
was ineffective when counsel did not inform the defendant of plea offers from the prosecu-
tion); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012) (holding that counsel’s deficient
performance during plea negotiations prejudiced the defendant when counsel advised the
defendant to not accept a plea deal and the defendant was ultimately convicted at trial).
92 See supra notes 64–70 and accompanying text.
93 See Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York
City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581, 762–67 (1987) (explaining how the filing of
written motions occurred in only twenty-six percent of homicide cases and eleven percent
of non-homicide felony cases, and visiting the crime scene occurred in only twelve percent
of homicides and four percent of non-homicides); see also Carrington, supra note 45, at 195
(discussing indigent defenders’ deficient investigation and stating, “No one will ever
know . . . whether the lawyer bothered to go to the crime scene . . . .  Most courts would not
approve the fee [for the time spent investigating], anyway.  But understanding the scene
and speaking to witnesses prior to the hearing is critical.”).
94 See Sanjay K. Chhablani, Chronically Stricken: A Continuing Legacy of Ineffective Assis-
tance of Counsel, 28 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 351, 352 (2008) (“Accounts from across the
country speak to pervasive inadequate representation . . . at all phases of criminal proceed-
ings[:] [f]ailure[s] to investigate[,] . . . engage in pre-trial work[,] . . . present evidence[,]
[and] . . . challenge unconstitutional, illegal[,] or improper conduct.  These anecdotal
reports have been corroborated year after year by reports and studies documenting the
crisis in indigent defense programs.”); see also Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas,
Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 975–76
(2012) (discussing “‘meet ‘em and plead ‘em’” defense lawyers, who “manage their crush-
ing workloads . . . [by] pressing their clients to plead guilty immediately[,] before doing
any investigation” (quoting STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM.
BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE 16 (2004)); id. (recounting “numerous examples of
representation so minimal that it amounted to no more than a hurried conversation with
the accused moments before entry of a guilty plea and sentencing”); Vivian O. Berger, The
Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths—A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9,
61 (1986) (noting that “crushing caseloads . . . promote lackluster performance by discour-
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cally speaking, if public defenders can find the resources to interview wit-
nesses in only about one-fifth of the homicide cases, where the defendant is
facing very dire straits, it is highly unlikely that public defenders will have the
resources to comb through much larger discovery files under an open-file
discovery regime.95
Open-file discovery would increase the workload for prosecutors, public
defenders, and the judiciary.  Increased workloads without an increased
workforce would result in less time allocated to each defendant at every step
of the criminal prosecution.  The only way to offset the increased workload
would be to increase the budgets of every department of the judicial
branch—an outcome highly unlikely to happen in the near future.96
III. THE SECOND HURDLE: REALISTIC RAMIFICATIONS
OF OPEN-FILE DISCOVERY
Open-file discovery would not work as a cure-all, as many supporters
believe.97  Expanded discovery for defendants would have negative conse-
quences—especially in situations where prosecutors act unethically.  First,
open-file discovery would do nothing to alleviate the biggest threat to defend-
ants—prosecutors and police who affirmatively act to withhold exonerating
evidence from defendants.  Even if all of the prosecution’s files are available
to a defendant, a prosecutor seeking to hide evidence could still take affirma-
tive steps to conceal pieces of favorable information.  Second, open-file dis-
covery would provide additional tools to prosecutors seeking to obstruct a
defendant’s counsel.  Open-file discovery paves the way for new types of
prosecutorial gamesmanship in which prosecutors can use mandatory infor-
mation disclosure to gain additional advantages over defendants.  Worse yet,
open-file discovery may lead prosecutors acting with the best of intentions to
unwittingly burden defendants’ counsel with too much information.98
aging careful investigation and mak[e] . . . guilty plea[s] an attractive option [for] coun-
sel”); Jane Fritsch & David Rohde, Lawyers Often Fail New York’s Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8,
2001, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/08/nyregion/lawyers-often-fail-
new-york-s-poor.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (“New York City offers representation to
the poor that routinely falls short of even the minimum standards recommended by legal
experts.”).
95 There is no indication that defense counsel met with all of the witnesses in the cases
in which defenders did speak with witnesses—only that at least a witness was interviewed.
96 See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
97 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
98 During a panel discussion at Georgia State University, former Assistant United
States Attorney Art Leach offered an insider perspective on open-file discovery and how it
can sometimes lead to an unintentional, bad result:
I would submit to you that . . . open-file discovery is the lazy approach to handling
discovery. . . .  [A]s counsel for the Government, . . . you’ll be unaware of many
details that appear in what you are presenting for discovery. . . .  By the time the
prosecutor realizes the problems that exist, it’s probably going to be too late [and
the defendant will have already pled guilty].
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A. Prosecutorial Malfeasance: The Michael Evans and Paul Terry Example
In an ideal world, each and every defendant would have an attorney who
could devote the time and effort necessary for a vigorous defense.  Setting
aside the financial limitations of this public defender utopia, there is another
major obstruction to the viability of open-file discovery as a solution to inade-
quate indigent defense: no realistic amount of time and effort could out-
weigh the endeavors of a malevolent prosecutor.  Assuming that the
resources for indigent defense were dramatically increased to a sufficient
level of funding, defense counsel would still likely be unable to discover
exculpatory evidence that the prosecution has taken affirmative steps to
conceal.99
Consider, for example, the case of Michael Evans and Paul Terry.100  Mr.
Evans and Mr. Terry were convicted of raping and murdering a nine-year-old
girl, serving twenty-seven years in prison before ultimately being exonerated
with the help of DNA evidence.101  During discovery in Mr. Evans’s and Mr.
Terry’s civil suits for their false imprisonment,102 the prosecution’s star wit-
ness, Judith Januszewski, revealed that during the criminal investigation
police officers used improper interrogation techniques to coerce her into
testifying to a story that would wrongfully convict Mr. Evans and Mr. Terry.103
When Mrs. Januszewski’s husband was deposed for the civil trial, he brought
to light concerns he had made known to police and prosecutors about the
reliability of his wife’s testimony during the criminal trial.104  Mr. Januszewski
also disclosed that during the criminal trial he accompanied his wife to the
courthouse to “rais[e] his reservations about her credibility to the prosecu-
tors,” but when he arrived at the courthouse he was “detained by . . . police
officers in a holding room until the end of the day.”105  This impeaching
evidence was not disclosed to the defense at the time of criminal trial and did
not come to light until after Mr. Evans and Mr. Terry had been exonerated
by DNA evidence.106
Panel Discussion: Criminal Discovery in Practice, supra note 30, at 805. See Burke, supra note
26, at 488 (arguing that “even virtuous prosecutors trying to do justice can err in their
good-faith attempts [to meet their ethical and constitutional disclosure requirements]”).
99 The increase in funding would have to be very large to meet not only the current
underfunding of indigent defense, but also the increased funding that would be necessary
to handle the larger workload associated with open-file discovery.
100 Evans v. City of Chicago, No. 04 C 3570, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9831, at *11, *18
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2006).
101 Id. at *2, *20–21; see Know the Cases: Browse Profiles: Michael Evans, INNOCENCE PRO-
JECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Michael_Evans.php (last visited Oct. 15,
2013); Know the Cases: Browse Profiles: Paul Terry, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.inno
cenceproject.org/Content/Paul_Terry.php (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
102 Evans, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9831, at *55.
103 Id. at *31 (“[P]olice officers questioning her allegedly suggested various names to
her as being the persons she claimed to have seen.”).
104 Id. at *30–32.
105 Id. at *32.
106 Id.
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While this example of prosecutorial and police misconduct is unsettling,
it is not supportive of a call for open-file discovery like some proponents have
claimed.107  In this case, and many other similar cases, the closedness of the
prosecution’s files was not the reason for the wrongful conviction.108  Mrs.
Januszewski was readily available for cross-examination during the criminal
trial, at which time her treatment during the police interrogation could have
been revealed.  Presumably, neither the illegal conditions of Mrs. Januszew-
ski’s interrogation, nor Mr. Januszewski’s detainment were documented in
any tangible files that could have been discovered by the criminal defense
counsel.  Even if the events had been documented and if this case had been
subject to an open-file discovery policy, it is not a far stretch to believe that a
prosecution willing to hide obvious Brady evidence would take an affirmative
step to withhold that evidence from inclusion in the discoverable files.109
Had Mr. Evans and Mr. Terry been prosecuted under an open-file policy,
their battle may have been even more frustrated by the belief that all possibly
discoverable evidence—and therefore all exculpatory evidence—had been
provided to them.110
Prosecutorial misconduct is “very difficult” to uncover, and when it is
discovered, it is usually found “by chance.”111  As one commentator queried
while discussing high-profile, nationally-known cases in which there was
prosecutorial misconduct:
[D]iscoveries [of misconduct are] often by happenstance.  If misconduct of
the extreme proportions present in these cases—cases that all received a
high level of public scrutiny because of their sensational nature—could go
undetected, what is the actual quantity and scope of overzealous misuse of
power in the thousands of other cases [that] are prosecuted each year, most
of which do not receive comparable scrutiny . . . ?112
If the prosecution has the desire to conceal evidence from the defense,
no level of openness will be sufficient to prevent this from happening.113
“Rare are the instances of misconduct that are not violations of rules that
107 See, e.g., THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 11, at 13–15 (“In the end, both men failed
to receive fair and just trials because prosecutors did not give the defense access to excul-
patory information that would have cast doubt on the testimony of the single eyewitness.”).
108 See generally Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059 (2009) (citing several examples of
prosecutorial misconduct).
109 See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1357 (2011) (explaining how prose-
cutors did not disclose lab tests determining the blood type found on evidence collected at
a crime scene, in spite of an office policy requiring that all “crime lab reports and other
scientific evidence [be turned] over to the defense”).
110 See infra Section III.B.
111 Michael D. Cicchini, Prosecutorial Misconduct at Trial: A New Perspective Rooted in Con-
frontation Clause Jurisprudence, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 339 n.21 (2006).
112 Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case Stud-
ies in an Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 959–60 (1998) (footnote omitted).
113 See Burke, supra note 26, at 489 (“[Prosecutors] are their own watchers.  If they
intentionally suppress evidence that might jeopardize a conviction, they can do so in the
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every legal professional . . . is charged with knowing.”114  Having an open-file
policy may just make concealing evidence easier to accomplish by creating
strategic weapons not available to prosecutors working under limited discov-
ery regimes.115
B. Open-File Discovery as a Prosecutorial Weapon
There are several examples of ways prosecutors have used the guise of an
open-file policy to make defendants believe they have all of the applicable
evidence.  Prosecutors have used open-file discovery as a gesture of good
faith to lull defendants into a belief that a motion for disclosure of Brady
evidence would be fruitless and therefore a waste of defense counsels’
resources.116  Further, in situations where there is Brady evidence that has
not been reduced to writing—for example, a witness’s uncertainty or infir-
mity, or where a police officer working on the investigation mentions some-
thing to the prosecutor while passing in the hallway—an open file would
produce nothing but a defense counselor who believes that he has all excul-
patory evidence and that he need not delve deeper into an investigation or
independently question witnesses.117
There have been other instances of prosecutorial gamesmanship—even
in situations where the prosecution has maintained a truly open-file discovery
policy, under which nothing is concealed, including Brady evidence.  In one
such case, an overwhelming mountain of evidence was put at the disposal of
the defense, with nary a clue where to begin its search.118  The court in that
case held that Brady merely requires disclosure of material evidence to the
comfort of knowing there is little chance the evidence will ever come to light . . . .” (foot-
note omitted)).
114 State v. Breit, 930 P.2d 792, 803 (N.M. 1996).
115 See infra Section III.B.
116 See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 276 (1999) (providing an example of
when defense counsel neglected to file a pretrial motion for discovery of possible exculpa-
tory evidence because an open-file policy gave defendant access to all of the evidence in
the prosecutor’s files—except the Brady evidence).  Similarly, North Carolina had a state
law mandating open-file discovery, yet Mr. Nifong “slipped up” and did not disclose the
“critical exculpatory evidence”—evidence found only because of the resources of the
defendants and the high profile nature of the Duke Lacrosse Case.  Bennett L. Gershman,
Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 546
(2006); see also supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text.
117 See Cassidy, supra note 37, at 1439, 1477–78. But see State v. Kaiser, 486 N.W.2d 384,
386–87 (Minn. 1992) (finding reversible error where prosecutor neglected to disclose a
witness’s doubts that had casually been mentioned to the prosecutor).
118 United States v. Causey, 356 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684, 686–87 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“The
plain language of Rule 16 [of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] does not require
the government to specify from among the . . . [eighty million pages of] discovery docu-
ments produced to defendants which documents it considers material to the
defense . . . .”); see United States v. Mmahat, 106 F.3d 89, 94 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he
government conceded that it had been aware of [the two pages of exculpatory evidence]
but argued that it had met its Brady obligation by disclosing them in the 500,000-page
cache [given to the defense]. . . .  We agree.”).
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defense, not a roadmap of the disclosed material.119  Some courts have
imposed limitations on the use of this “Brady Dump”—concealment of excul-
patory evidence within mountains of irrelevant material—but they are not
exactly strict limitations.120  For example, the Fifth Circuit has noted that
“evidence that the government ‘padded’ an open file with pointless or super-
fluous information . . . might raise serious Brady issues.”121  While this limita-
tion might appear to disparage bad faith gamesmanship by the prosecution,
it is really just a paper tiger.  The burden to show bad faith is on the defen-
dant,122 and it would likely require someone in the prosecutor’s office to
blow the whistle on the Brady Dump tactic.123
Even in states where open-file discovery is the law of the land, some
judges have been reluctant to read discovery statutes to their full breadth.124
For example, North Carolina law requires the State to “[m]ake available to
the defendant the complete files of all law enforcement and prosecutorial agen-
cies involved in the investigation of the crimes committed or the prosecution
of the defendant.”125  This broad language would appear to provide the
defendant unfettered access to every piece of evidence at the prosecutor’s
disposal.  However, in a case upholding a conviction for statutory rape, a
North Carolina appellate court read the discovery statute to exclude valuable
notes taken during the criminal investigation by the State Department of
Social Services (“DSS”).126  In reaching its conclusion, the court found no
support for the contention that DSS is a prosecutorial agency, even though
DSS employees performed independent investigations of the alleged child
abuse, referred the matter to the police, and were present during police
interviews with the victim.127  Shortly before this decision, the North Caro-
119 See Causey, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 693–94 (finding no Brady violation even though it
would take the defense “15 years to review every page” assuming “100 attorneys working 12
hours a day” and spending only “30 seconds reviewing each of the[ ] 80 million pages . . .
[and that t]o establish a Brady violation the defendants must show that the information
allegedly withheld from them was not available through due diligence”).
120 See Cohen & Walsman, supra note 18, at 2.
121 United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 577 (5th Cir. 2009).
122 Id. at 568; see also id. at 577 (“[C]onsidering . . . the equal access . . . to the open file
. . . and the absence of evidence that the government used the open file . . . in bad faith, we
hold that the government’s use of the open file did not violate Brady.” (emphasis added)).
123 See Cohen & Walsman, supra note 18, at 2 (“[I]t would take a miracle—or, more
likely, a whistleblower out of the prosecutor’s office (also, likely a miracle)—for an
aggrieved defendant to prove such intent.”).
124 See, e.g., State v. Pendleton, 622 S.E.2d 708, 709–10 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
125 Pendleton, 622 S.E.2d at 709 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1) (2003)
(emphasis added)).  Note that since the holding of this case, the North Carolina legisla-
ture has amended the statute to include the files of “investigatory agencies,” arguably over-
ruling this case. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903(a)(1) (West 2011).  An investigatory
agency is any “public or private entity that obtains information on behalf of a law enforce-
ment agency or prosecutor’s office.” N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903(a)(1)(b1) (West
2011).
126 Pendleton, 622 S.E.2d at 709.  The notes included names of possible witnesses. Id.
127 Id. at 709–10.
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lina State Legislature had completely revamped the state’s discovery laws in
an effort to “requir[e] automatic disclosure of all nonprivileged information
in the prosecution’s entire file.”128  Despite the underlying purpose of the
legislature—complete open-file discovery—the court read the law literally,
essentially treating the legislative disclosure requirements as both a floor and
a ceiling.
Broadening the level of discovery available to criminal defendants would
create many unintended side effects.  In addition to the good—a more fair
trial where the defendant has a complete picture of the evidence—open-file
discovery comes with much of the bad.  Prosecutors acting in bad faith would
not be deterred by an open-file policy and may even be able to use expanded
discovery to further their malevolent conduct.  Whether the prosecution
intentionally over-discloses information to the defense counsel or does so
unintentionally, public defenders could find themselves looking for a needle
in a haystack.  Even where states have taken steps to enact expanded discov-
ery statutes, courts have been reluctant to see the wisdom of completely
opening the floodgates.  Though judges are not elected to represent the peo-
ple, they are on the frontlines of criminal discovery and have a much more
informed position than do legislators.  This may be a scenario where defer-
ence to the courts is a good idea.
CONCLUSION
The system is not perfect.  Not all prosecutors live up to the high ethical
standards expected of them, and occasionally, as a result, defendants are con-
victed of crimes they did not commit.  But on the whole, prosecutors prop-
erly exercise the will of the people they have been elected to represent and
serve.129  Prosecutors like those in the Duke Lacrosse Case and the Michael
Evans and Paul Terry case are the rare outliers—and changes to the breadth
of discovery would have little to no impact on these exceptional occur-
rences.130  When Brady violations do occur, insiders have indicated that it is
“more omission than commission.”131  Prosecutors, while they do have
greater resources than do indigent defense counsel, are still overworked.132
128 Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1331,
1331 n.45 (2011) (emphasis added); see S.B. No. 52, 2004 Gen. Assemb., Sess. 2003 (N.C.
2004).
129 Forty-seven of the fifty states’ chief prosecutors are elected officials. CAROL J.
DEFRANCES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 193441, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2001, at 11
(2002).
130 In fact, cases like this are very rare.  Over the forty-year period from 1961–2001,
there were only 270 instances where convictions were overturned or a new trial was
ordered because of undisclosed evidence.  Richard A. Serrano, Withheld Evidence Can Give
Convicts New Life, L.A. TIMES (May 29, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/may/29/
news/mn-3771.
131 Panel Discussion: Criminal Discovery in Practice, supra note 30, at 810.
132 See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
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When prosecutors neglect to turn over Brady evidence to the defense, it is
oftentimes because they “just don’t know” that the material is in their files.133
The traditional arguments for and against open-file discovery hold true.
The stakes of a criminal trial—sometimes life in prison, or even death—
greatly outweigh the stakes of a civil trial.  In a perfect world, criminal
defendants would have access to all of the evidence against them, and they
would receive stellar, thorough representation.  The “quest for truth” is the
crux of the American legal system,134 and that truth is most easily found
when all parties have complete information.  Further, the threat of innocent
defendants pleading guilty because they do not know the weight of the prose-
cutor’s evidence seems to be overstated.  However, the threats posed by open-
file discovery cannot be easily cured.  Defendants who know the identity of
witnesses will be able to disrupt the judicial process with intimidation and
threats.  Just knowing that defendants will know their witnesses’ identities
long before trial might cause witnesses to be less willing to step forward in
criminal investigations.  Additionally, defendants already have many procedu-
ral advantages in adversarial criminal trials.  Opening prosecutors’ files
would put defendants in an even more advantageous position.
Apart from the traditional arguments made in the open-file discovery
debate, the practical effects of increased discovery rights would actually serve
to harm the majority of defendants.  Open-file discovery may alleviate some
of the risk of Brady violations, but the costs to the legal system—including
costs to defendants—would outweigh the benefits.  The budgetary con-
straints on indigent defense representation do not allow for an increased
workload.  Opening prosecutors’ files would create problems of inadequate
representation among public defenders.  Not only would this result in more
Strickland claims, but it might also cause more injustice by forcing prosecu-
tors and police departments to be overly diligent before pursuing a criminal
conviction.  This is not to say diligence is a bad thing, but rather that the
prosecution would be unable to devote the resources required to thoroughly
investigate every crime truly worthy of pursuit.  Prosecutors would lose their
main incentive to plea bargain and the judiciary would face an increased
workload.
In addition to the economic infeasibility of open-file discovery, the real
threat to defendants—prosecutorial malfeasance—would be unaffected by
increased discovery.  Prosecutors intent on concealing evidence from defend-
ants would be unabated by open-file discovery.  Evidence that is never
reduced to writing, or some other tangible form, cannot be in a prosecutor’s
file to discover.  Even if evidence is in written form, a prosecutor acting with
bad intentions could exclude that piece of evidence from the “complete
open file” given to the defense counsel.  Open-file discovery would also pre-
sent more subtle ways for prosecutors to frustrate defense counsel—specifi-
cally by misleading defense counsel into incorrectly thinking that the
133 Panel Discussion: Criminal Discovery in Practice, supra note 30, at 812.
134 Brennan, supra note 19, at 279.
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prosecutor has turned over all of the evidence or by overwhelming defense
counsel with superfluous information.
Rather than rely on the already overworked public defender system to
shoulder the responsibility of discovering material exculpatory evidence, the
better allocation of the duty is to keep the status quo and charge the prosecu-
tion with the obligation to turn over Brady evidence.  Simply put, “[a]n attor-
ney appointed to represent a capital defendant . . . [and] granted only $500
for expert and investigative expenses” is in a much inferior position to be
responsible for discovering and utilizing exculpatory evidence, as compared
to “the other side with three prosecutors and an array of law enforcement
agencies and expert witnesses.”135  Obviously there are pitfalls to having lim-
ited discovery, but a transition to open-file discovery would only serve to fur-
ther burden public defenders while doing very little to cure malevolent
prosecutors.  The proper focus of prosecutorial reform is not the extent of
the discovery available to defendants, but rather remedial oversight of bad-
faith prosecutions.  The occasional unjust convictions will continue, but
assigning even more work to underfunded indigent defense counsel would
only further diminish the adequacy of representation for indigent
defendants.
135 Chhablani, supra note 94, at 386.
